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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 










 This paper studies institutional investor allocations in socially responsible private equity.  
The data show that socially responsible investment (SRI) is more common among institutional 
investors with a greater international investment focus, and among institutions that place greater 
importance on the International Financial Reporting Standards.  The data further indicate SRI is 
more common when the decision to implement such an investment plan is centralised with a 
single Chief Investment Officer, and less common among fund-of-fund investments.   
 
 
Keywords:  Corporate Social Responsibility, International Institutional Investment, Private 
Equity 
 




This study empirically investigates the factors that motivate institutional investors to 
allocate capital to socially responsible private equity investments.  Private equity fund managers 
act as financial intermediaries between institutional investors and entrepreneurial firms.  Private 
equity is a viable and important asset class for institutional investors,1 and there has been a 
growing trend towards socially responsible investment practices.2  Prior research has not 
considered an empirical analysis of the intersection between corporate social responsibility and 
private equity.  This issue is nevertheless important for institutional investor capital allocation, as 
well as for private equity funds and companies seeking capital for undertaking socially 
responsible entrepreneurial activities. This study seeks to facilitate an understanding of the factors 
that drive institutional investors to socially responsible private equity investment, and ascertain 
whether there are differences based on the extent of internationalization of such investments, the 
legal reporting standards governing such investments, and the allocation of responsibility for 
decision making over the allocation of capital to socially responsible private equity investments. 
 
We introduce in this paper a new dataset from a survey of Dutch institutional investors 
that was carried out in 2005.  The survey data comprise information from 100 Dutch institutions, 
24 of which currently have a socially responsible investment program (of these, 14 include 
socially responsible private equity investment programs), and 19 which plan on adopting a 
socially responsible investment program over the period 2006-2010 (of these, 5 include socially 
responsible private equity investment programs).  The data comprise extremely specific details on 
the institutions’ portfolio management practices, as well as their perceptions of the importance of 
various economic, legal and institutional factors that influence their portfolio allocation decisions.  
Institutional investors’ positions regarding their objectives in their strategic asset allocation were 
sought. More significantly, views regarding the perceived risks and hurdles faced by such 
investors were sought to determine main concerns in adopting socially responsible investment.  
The data enable an empirical assessment of institutional investor allocations to socially 
                                                 
     1 For recent literature on private equity and venture capital, see, e.g., Bascha and Walz (2001a,b), 
Black and Gilson (1998), Berglof (1994), Bergmann and Hege (1998), Berger and Udel (1998), Gompers 
and Lerner (1999), Hege et al. (2004), Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003, 2004), Keuschnigg and Nielsen 
(2001, 2003a,b, 2004), Lockett and Wright (1999, 2001), Lockett et al. (2002), Manigart et al. (2000, 
2002a,b,c), Mayer (2001), Mayer, Schoors and Yafeh, (2005), Neus and Walz (2005), Sapienza (1992), 
Sapienza et al., (1996), Wright and Lockett (2001, 2003) and Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001, 2003). 
     2 For recent literature on corporate social responsibility and socially responsible investment, see, 
e.g., McWilliams and Siegel (2001a,b, 1999, 1997), McWilliams, Siegel and Wright (2005) and Paton and 
Siegel (2005), and Lockett et al. (2005). 
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responsible investment with consideration to controls for a variety of factors potentially pertinent 
to asset allocation. 
 
The data indicate three primary findings.  First, counter to our expectations, socially 
responsible private equity investments tend to be more common among institutional investors that 
invest internationally.  Consistent with literature that institutions tend to export their social harms 
(discussed in section 2), we had expected socially responsible private equity investment to be 
more common domestically in view of the fact that institutional investors’ beneficiaries (and 
public perception) are primarily based within the country in which they reside, particularly for 
The Netherlands.  However, we find the opposite for Dutch institutional investments in Europe 
outside The Netherlands and for the US.  In particular, we find socially responsible investment is 
approximately 1-2% more common among institutional investors with a 10% greater international 
investment focus in Europe outside The Netherlands, and this difference is statistically significant 
in a multivariate setting with controls for a variety of factors that affect institutional investment.  
We also provide evidence in a multivariate setting that socially responsible investment is 
approximately 5-6% more common among institutional investors with a 10% greater international 
investment focus in the US.  By contrast, socially responsible investment is less common for 
Dutch institutional investor investments in Asia. 
 
Second, the data indicate socially responsible investment is more common among 
institutional investors that are more sensitive to the new International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) (2005).  We find a positive and statistically significant correlation between an 
institutional investor’s ranking of the importance of the IFRS and the adoption of a socially 
responsible private equity investment program.  We note, however, that other factors may 
independently affect this association as the relation between these variables is not robust in a 
multivariate context with controls for other factors.  As such, the data offer suggestive but not 
conclusive evidence that institutions are sensitive to reporting standards and public perception of 
their socially responsible investment activities. 
 
Third, the data indicate socially responsible private equity investment is more common 
when the decision to implement such an investment plan is placed in more the hands of a Chief 
Investment Officer (CIO, or the head of capital investments), as opposed to a broader investment 
team.  When a CIO is in charge, a socially responsible private equity investment program is 
approximately 40-50% more likely to be adopted.  The intuition for this result lies in the 
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perception that socially responsible investments involve a sacrifice in expected returns,3 and 
when investment personnel within an institutional investor compete with each other on the basis 
of their returns performance, they are less likely to invest in the lower expected return socially 
responsible investments.  By contrast, when a CIO is in charge of the type of investments to be 
carried out, socially responsible investment programs are much more likely to be adopted.  
 
In the course of empirical analyses and robustness checks, we further show socially 
responsible private equity investment programs are also more common among larger institutional 
investors and those expecting greater economic returns from socially responsible investments.  
We find no statistically significant differences in the propensity to carry out socially responsible 
investments depending on the type of investor (pension fund, insurance company or bank / 
financial institution).  We do find evidence that socially responsible investment is less common 
among institutional investors that invest a greater proportion in private equity fund-of-funds, 
which is expected as fund-of-funds remove the decision making from the institutional investors to 
the fund-of-funds managers.  We also proffer evidence that the factors that affect socially 
responsible investment decisions for private equity are quite similar to those for other asset 
classes.  The findings from the new data, among others discussed herein, indicate a number of 
avenues for further research which are outlined herein. 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 outlines the theoretical propositions and 
testable hypotheses.  The data are introduced in section 3, and summary statistics are provided in 
that section.  Section 4 provides the multivariate empirical analyses of socially responsible asset 
allocations by Dutch institutional investors.  Limitations are discussed and suggestions for future 
research are outlined in section 5.  Concluding remarks follow in the last section. 
 
2. Testable Hypotheses 
 
 In subsection 2.1 we overview factors that are relevant to institutional investor socially 
responsible investment (“SRI”) allocation objectives, and conjecture three main testable 
hypotheses in reference to internationalization, international reporting standards and the nature of 
decision making within an institution.  Subsection 2.2 thereafter considers the role of other 
control factors that influence institutional investor capital commitments to SRI, such as size and 
                                                 
     3 It is worth pointing out that socially responsible investment returns are not universally regarded to 
be lower than their counterparts; see infra note 8 and accompanying text.   
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expected returns, type of investment (such as fund-of-funds investments), and type of institutional 
investor (pension fund, insurance company and bank / financial institution). 
 
2.1. Institutional Investors’ Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) Allocation Objectives 
 
Institutional investors have various motivations in their investment strategies when 
deciding to allocate capital to equities, bonds, derivatives and alternative investments, such as 
private equity.  Portfolios are specifically designed to optimally trade-off risk and return by 
allocation of the portfolio to appropriately diversified combinations of assets, with consideration 
to institutional and regulatory factors, and possibly behavioral biases and decision making 
processes.  Following upon the potential affect behavioral biases and decision making processes 
may have on an institution determining current and projected levels of asset allocation, this study 
seeks to ascertain a potential trend towards investing in a more specialised form of private equity, 
socially responsible private equity, also sometimes referred to sustainable private equity.  
 
We believe that a potential trend towards this more specialised form of private equity 
within the institutional market should be considered empirically as it has been noted that there is 
increased movement internationally towards making the more objective social and environmental 
criteria important factors in an institution’s subjective business decisions, especially in the United 
States and Europe. This has correspondingly led to a substantial increase, since the early 1990’s, 
of SRI which, to put it simply, is an investment process that in addition to pure financial criteria, 
takes social, moral, legality and environmental aspects into account. As socially responsible 
companies are reaping the benefits of social awareness and increasing public interest in social 
responsibility, institutional investors, ever ready to share in such benefits, have started showing 
increased interest in SRI. They have either initiated programs or announced their intention to 
incorporate SRI in their asset allocation. It is expected that levels of SRI will only rise as it will 
be a natural progression for institutional investors to expand their asset portfolio, therefore it will 
be of interest to determine to what extent this will affect private equity investment levels. 
 
Note that this study does not seek to gain insight into the qualitative aspects of an 
institutional investor’s SRI policies, as it is more concerned with the more quantitative aspects of 
institutional SRI. However, it was recognized that SRI programs have to be defined to a certain 
extent. Before we set out our definition on a SRI program, we highlight two main considerations. 
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First, we note that there is no strict definition of SRI. Institutions, while provided general 
guidelines by both regulators and stakeholders, are not as yet bound by any legislation, rules or 
regulations, and instead create their own internal policies.4 It is up to each institution to determine 
to what extent social responsibility and each socially responsible issue will affect its asset 
allocation and investment objectives.  
 
Second, the practice of corporate social responsibility does not mean that returns need to 
be sacrificed. An effective SRI program should incorporate the aim to gain the maximum possible 
return for stakeholders in the institution, at an acceptable risk of course, with the idea of 
combining social, moral, legality and environmental concerns. 
 
Such concerns are addressed generally with a SRI program that utilizes both a “negative 
screening” method and a “best in class” method. The institutions included in this study are 
deemed to have SRI programs where they have defined policies which exclude certain 
investments in companies or funds which invest in companies that are either conducting harmful 
activities or are present in countries where such harmful activities are rampant. Such activities 
may be related to moral and legality issues such as where fundamental human rights are being 
violated, corruption is widespread, and there is continuous failure to meet legislative standards 
related to labor. The taking into account of environmental issues will possibly exclude 
investments in companies with extremely poor environmental policies, and social issues may 
exclude companies involved in the production of weapons. The use of this method “negative 
screening” in excluding potential investments will have to be utilized in conjunction with the 
more positive “best in class” method, where positive criteria are also used to determine 
investment objectives. Here, investments are encouraged in companies or funds which invest in 
companies where social value-add is a goal, for example where fundamental human rights are not 
only adhered to, but where conducive working conditions are primary. Companies that take an 
innovative approach to implementing environmental policies are also deemed to fall within this 
category. The examples we have listed here are of course not exhaustive, but only meant to 
illustrate the “ingredients” of a SRI program. The institutions surveyed in this study were left to 
decide if their SRI policies and practices, if any, fell within the scope of an integrated SRI 
program that is consistent with industry definitions (Social Investment Forum, 2003).  
 
                                                 
     4 Public pressure may eventually result in institutional investors being forced to declare to what 
extent social and environmental criteria are factors in their investment decisions. 
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While it is easy to see why institutions are moving towards SRI, we have to acknowledge 
that the majority of institutional investors do not currently have SRI programs. Of the 100 
institutions surveyed, only 24 currently have a SRI program for any asset class (of these, 14 
include socially responsible private equity investment programs). However, 19 institutions plan 
on adopting a SRI program over the period 2006-2010 (of these, 5 include socially responsible 
private equity investment programs).  Reasons for the hesitance on the part of institutions to enter 
the SRI arena may include the perception that with corporate social responsibility, optimal returns 
may be forfeited. Institutions, at the end of the day, have the main goal of creating and 
maintaining stakeholder value. While some stakeholders deem social responsibility to be an 
important factor, others may see it as separate from their main aim of obtaining the best financial 
returns.  The ability to balance stakeholder needs may be more easily achieved by some 
institutions (or rather the managers and board of directors of these institutions) than by others. 
The human resource factor in formulating and implementing SRI programs is also analyzed in 
this study.  Also, many institutions are able to hide behind the cloak of confidentiality to evade 
calls by their stakeholders to increase social responsibility. They can easily justify their secrecy 
on policies on the need to protect the same stakeholders seeking increased transparency.  This 
cloak of confidentiality is also the main reason why we have in this study relied on survey 
responses provided confidentially by respondents.  
 
 Based on these considerations, our central interest in this paper is in investigating the 
propensity of an institution to adopt an SRI program in private equity, and how this decision is 
related to the extent of their international investment activities, reporting standards, and internal 
decision making.  First, in regards to internationalization, we expected SRI to be more common 
domestically in view of the fact that institutional investors’ stakeholders are primarily based 
within the country in which they reside, particularly for The Netherlands. SRI are not only on the 
rise as a result of increasing social awareness by institutions, but primarily as a result of the 
increasing public interest in social responsibility, and thus the public perception that institutions 
need to “return to society” that what is given to them by the stakeholders. It is often charged that 
multinational corporations export social harms (see, e.g., McInerney, 2005).5  And as “charity 
begins at home”, it is expected that stakeholders want to enjoy the benefits that increased 
                                                 
     5  Certainly in corrupt countries, it is expected that corporations are more likely to export social harm 
(see, e.g., Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck and Eden, 2003) 
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corporate social responsibility brings, such as increased adherence to labor and environmental 
laws by local companies. 
 
Hypothesis 1: An institutional investor is more likely to invest in socially responsible 
investment domestically as opposed to internationally. 
 
A related matter to the internationalization of investment involves the role of law versus 
economics in driving institutional investor capital allocation decisions to socially responsible 
private equity.  We expect the role of the new International Financial Reporting Standards 
(adopted in 2005) to influence the extent to which institutions make investments in private equity.  
That is, we expect increased transparency of investment decisions, thus increased vulnerability to 
public perception and pressure, to lead to a greater tendency towards socially responsible 
investments (consistent with McInerney, 2005, Kolk, 2005; Hillman and Kleim, 2004; Kolk and 
Tulder, 2001; Kolk, Tulder and Welters, 1999; Shaffer, 1995), as indicated formally in our 
second hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: With increased transparency as a result of the new the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) (2005), institutions are more likely to adopt 
socially responsible investment programs. 
 
As discussed, institutions (or rather their human resources) will have to balance the 
conflicting needs of its stakeholders. Any decision made by management, or the board of 
directors, will affect each stakeholder differently. As such, decisions on important policies 
regarding investment and asset allocation, which will directly affect the returns of the institution, 
are not taken lightly. In an institution where there is decentralized investment decision making, 
where a general investment team comprising employees competing with one another over their 
return performance, each employee is more likely to maximize expected returns as a form of 
competition and less likely to adopt potentially less profitable SRI. In an organization where 
investment decisions are centralized through a Chief Investment Officer, who is not only a 
member of management but also the Board of Directors, it is more probable that innovative (thus 
untested and risky) SRI policies be formulated and approved. The Board, in the exercise of their 
discretion, will deem their reliance on the CIO’s advice sufficient to meet their duty of care, 
regardless of the outcome of the implementation of the program. This suggests that the presence 
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of a CIO can facilitate a socially responsible investment.6  Moreover, there are reputation 
incentives for compliance with norms of corporate social responsibility that institutions are more 
likely to comply with when decisions are made centrally (Saconni, 2004).  It has also been argued 
that corporations will adopt corporate social responsibility when they recognize their stakeholders 
prefer such policies (thereby increasing firm value); firms will be more likely to recognize and 
implement the corporate social responsibility preferences of their stakeholders and implement 
such preferences when decisions about socially responsible investment are made centrally (Small 
and Zivin, 2002). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Socially responsible investment programs are more likely to be adopted by 
institutions that centralize investment decision making. 
 
2.2. Other Factors Relevant to Institutional Investors’ Decisions to Allocate Capital to Socially 
Responsible Investments 
 
 The primary objective of institutional investors’ asset allocation is to achieve the most 
optimal trade-off of risk and return.  The achievement of this objective however will differ in 
accordance with specific institutional characteristics.  For example, a pension fund and a bank 
will have different funding and solvency requirements, assets and liabilities, and extent of 
regulatory oversight.  Different institutions may exhibit differences in corporate objectives, 
contributor/stakeholder/beneficiary demographics, and sensitivity to regulatory oversight and 
accounting rules.  Hence, our empirical analyses control for the type of institutional investor7 
(pension funds, insurance companies and banks / financial institutions exist in our data, as 
described in the next section), among other things discussed below.  
 
Private fund managers are financial intermediaries between institutional investors and 
entrepreneurial firms.  Institutional investors do not have the time and specialized skill set to 
carry out due diligence in screening potential private entrepreneurial firms in which to invest; 
                                                 
     6 A related argument could be that more socially responsible people go to work for corporations 
with centralized decision making, although that proposition is not testable with our dataset.  There is 
evidence that corporate social responsibility affects MBA employment decisions (Montgomery and Ramus, 
2003). 
     7 The controls for type of institutional investor are consistent with related work showing differences in 
incentives of different types of institutional investors that invest in private equity (Mayer et al., 2005; Lerner et al., 
2005). 
 11
institutional investors also do not have the time and skills to efficiently monitor and add value to 
the investee entrepreneurial firms.  The pronounced risks, information asymmetries and agency 
problems associated with investments in small, illiquid, and high-tech entrepreneurial firms is a 
primary explanation for the existence of private investment funds with specialized skill sets to 
mitigate such problems.  We conjecture that institutional investors with larger asset bases are 
more inclined to invest in private equity and in socially responsible investments which require 
more extensive due diligence. 
 
Investments in private equity can be carried out as direct fund investments, direct 
company investments, or fund-of-fund investments.  Private equity fund-of-funds allocate their 
institutional investors’ assets in what they perceive to be the top private equity funds; therefore, 
fund-of-funds remove the decision to invest in socially responsible ways from the institutional 
investor.  As such, fund-of-funds investments are less likely to be socially responsible because 
they need to balance the needs of many institutional investors and do so by following a strict 
profit maximizing objective.  We control for fund-of-fund investments in our empirical tests. 
 
We further consider other control variables in the empirical analyses.  For instance, we 
control for the expected return on socially responsible investments relative to that of other 
investments.8  The higher the relative expected return for socially responsible investments, the 
greater the allocation to socially responsible investments.   
 
In the empirical analyses of the hypotheses outlined in subsection 2.1, these and other 
control variables identified in this subsection are considered.  The data and summary statistics are 
described in the next section.  Thereafter in section 4 multivariate empirical tests are provided.  A 
discussion of limitations, alternative explanation, future research and concluding remarks follows 




                                                 
     8 In our data (described in the next section), some of the institutional ranked socially responsible 
investment returns quite highly and to be comparable with other asset classes, consistent with recent 
empirical evidence (see, e.g., Doweell, Hart and Yeung, 2000; Schroder, 2003; Ali and Gold, 2002; 
Greczy, Stambaugh  and Levin, 2003; Derwall and Koedijk, 2005; Plantinga and Scholtens, 2001).  As 
well, note that recent evidence indicates socially responsible investments do not provide significant 
diversification benefits (Bello, 2005). 
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3. Data  
 
3.1. Methods and Survey Instrument 
 
We introduce in this paper a new dataset from 100 Dutch institutional investors.  The data 
assembled for this paper are derived primarily from a survey of Dutch institutional investors 
carried out between February 2005 and May 2005.  This use of surveys was necessary for the 
research questions considered in this paper. Data on past and current institutional asset allocation 
and investment levels in private equity do exist from some venture capital / private equity 
associations and annual financial reports,9 but other information such as projected or future asset 
allocation, investment objectives and current and projected SRI activity are not available in the 
public domain, and in our opinion, could only be obtained by survey. Our survey instrument also 
enabled us to determine the perceived effect the International Financial Reporting Standards had 
on SRI activity. To verify and enhance data obtained by the survey, follow up interviews were 
carried out and where possible, reference was made to institutions’ web sites and publications. 
 
The instrument we used to obtain the detailed data required about domestic and 
international SRI activity by Dutch institutions is a 13 page questionnaire, comprising 32 
questions. Robustness is achieved chiefly by framing questions in a way that calls for numeric 
responses, or a simple “yes” or “no” response. In view of the fact that the potential respondents, 
while financial institutions, are from different branches of finance, a glossary of terms was 
provided in the survey to ensure uniformity in defining terms which may not necessarily be used 
in the same manner across sectors. An overview of the information collected is summarized in 
Table 1 which defines the primary variables used in this study. 
 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
 
3.2. Potential Sample Selection Bias 
 
The potential respondents, the population of institutional investors in The Netherlands, 
were identified from various sources including, but not limited to the following: 
1. Pensioen & Verzekeringskamer (Pensions and insurance supervisory authority of the 
Netherlands, PVK); 
                                                 
     9 See, e.g., www.evca.com for European data and www.nvp.nl for Dutch data. 
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2. De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) 
3. Autoriteit Financiële Markten (The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets, 
AFM) 
4. The Dutch Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (NVP) and the European 
Venture Capital Association; and 
5. Web sites of Dutch financial institutions. 
 
Pursuant to identifying the appropriate contact persons, the survey instrument was sent to 
approximately 1114 Dutch institutions, comprising: 
a. 797 Pension Funds10, including company pension funds, industrial pension funds, and 
occupational pension funds; 
b. 205 Insurance companies11; and 
c. 112 Banks12, including Universal Banks, Securities credit institutions, Savings banks, 
Mortgage banks, and other financial service providers. 
 
Participation was chiefly solicited with the promise that the aggregated survey results 
would be disseminated to respondents. Only one questionnaire was disseminated in hard copy by 
mail to each institution, and addressed specifically to the institution’s Chief Investment Officer or 
an equivalent manager of private equity investments for an institution where such contact details 
are available. 
 
One limitation to obtaining data through a survey is the possibility of sample selection 
bias. While we acknowledge that this is a possibility, we believe from a detailed analysis of the 
responses received and the data obtained from the responses that this concern does not arise in 
                                                 
     10 All types of pension funds were included to mitigate response bias. As of 2004, all pension funds 
in the Netherlands had assets at €442 billion, with Dutch company pensions having assets of over €141 
billion Pension funds with assets below €1 million have however been excluded (954 in total) primarily 
because the possibility of sample selection bias is mitigated by the breadth of asset size of the pension 
funds that were sent survey questionnaires.  Of the 797 pension funds surveyed, 524 have assets between 
€10 million to €1 billion. A majority of those have assets less than €100 million. 34 Pension Funds control 
assets between €1 billion and €5 billion, while 12 have more than €5 billion within their control. 
     11 Those institutions within this category but described as institutions with an office in the 
Netherlands, or with unrestricted services to the Netherlands and mutual benefit companies have not been 
included. While their inclusion will increase the approximate figure provided to 1916, they are not deemed 
as Dutch institutions for the purposes of this study. As in the case of the target pension funds, we believe 
that the breadth of asset size of the insurance companies that were sent survey questionnaires mitigates any 
possible sample selection bias. Of the number surveyed, 32 have assets between €100 million and €1 
billion, 27 have more than €1 billion and 29 have less than €100 million. 
     12  Non-EU and EU bank branches have not been included. 
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this exercise.  First, survey data were gathered for a final sample of 100 institutional investors 
comprising company pension funds, industrial pension funds, occupational pension funds, life 
and non-life insurance companies, banks and other financial service providers. Our sample of 
respondent institutions includes 56 pension funds, 25 insurance companies, and 19 banks (see 
Table 2). Limitations in our sample size from each sector of the finance industry from which we 
derived data, as well as the limited information about comparable academic work on institutional 
investor behaviour in private equity, however, makes reliable statistical comparisons of our 
sample relative to the population of other types of investors in private equity intractable. 
 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
 
Second, a broad array of respondents replied to the survey.  For example, the data show 
the median respondent asset size of €800,000,000 and the average being €4,665,000,000, 
indicating respondents were of a variety of asset sizes. The possibility of sample selection bias is 
further reduced by the presence of institutions that do not currently allocate any of their assets to 
private equity, and do not plan to allocate any up to 2010, institutions that plan to increase current 
allocations in the near future and also institutions that plan to reduce allocations by 2010. We 
further did not find a statistically significant difference between average assets of respondents 
versus non-respondents. 
 
Finally, a sufficient number of variables including, but not limited to, the percentage of 
the institution’s total assets both currently allocated and projected to be allocated to specified 
asset classes including equities, bonds, cash/currencies, index funds, and alternative investments 
(Hedge funds, commodities, private equity, property/real estate), current and projected 
distribution of socially responsible private equity investments both within The Netherlands and 
across regions such as Europe, Asia, USA and the rest of the world, current and projected 
distribution of socially responsible private equity investments according to type of investment 
such as direct investments, direct fund investments and fund-of-fund investments, which type of 
investment is utilised for both local and regional socially responsible private equity investments, 
and the degree of importance placed by the institution of existing and proposed Dutch regulations 
on asset allocation strategies. We unfortunately realise that we cannot be absolutely rule out the 




3.2. Summary Statistics 
 
The data indicate that the 100 institutional investors comprising pension funds, insurance 
companies, banks and other financial institutions invested on average 1.09% of their assets in 
private equity as at 2005, and planned on investing 1.44% of their assets in private equity over the 
period 2006 – 2010 (Table 2 Panel B).  Out of these 100 institutions, 19 plan on (over the period 
2006 – 2010) investing on average more than 2.5% of their assets in private equity, 10 plan on 
investing more than 5% of their assets in private equity, and 6 plan on investing more than 7.5% 
of their assets in private equity.  Total private equity investment accounted for approximately 
€10.5 billion as at 2005.  The proportional allocations to private equity in The Netherlands are 
consistent with institutional investor allocations to private equity funds in the US (see, e.g., 
Gompers and Lerner, 1999) and Australia (see, e.g., Cumming et al., 2005). 
 
Figure 1 indicates 24 (of 100) institutions currently have a socially responsible 
investment program (of these, 14 include socially responsible private equity investment 
programs), and 19 which plan on adopting a socially responsible investment program over the 
period 2006-2010 (of these, 5 include socially responsible private equity investment programs).  
Figure 2 shows the investment in socially responsible investment programs by type of 
institutional investor (pension fund, insurance company and bank).  The picture in Figure 2 does 
not suggest there is a material difference in the propensity to invest in socially responsible 
investments across different types of Dutch institutions.  Figures 3 and 4 indicate the percentage 
of institutions that have socially responsible private equity investments among those institutions 
that allocate more than 25% of their total private equity investments in a particular region.  Figure 
3 presents the data for 2005, and Figure 4 presents the data for planned allocations in 2006-2010.  
The data indicate there are differences over time in the propensity to invest internationally in 
socially responsible investments: international socially responsible private equity investments 
among Dutch institutions are becoming more common in Europe outside The Netherlands and in 
the US.  Figures 3 and 4 also indicate that Asian investments by Dutch institutions are socially 
responsible. 
 
[Insert Figures 1 – 4 About Here] 
 
Tables 3 and 4 provide comparison tests and a correlation matrix, respectively.  These 
univariate tests indicate relations between the variables without simultaneously controlling for 
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other factors.  The univariate summary statistics and tests in Tables 3 and 4 indicate socially 
responsible private equity investment is more common for European investments outside The 
Netherlands, and investments in the United States from Dutch institutional investors.  Socially 
responsible investment is more common when institutional investors rank the importance of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards as being more important.  Socially responsible 
investment is less common for fund-of-funds investments.  Socially responsible investment is 
more common among larger institutions, and among institutions that centralize decision making 
responsibility via a Chief Investment Officer. 
 
[Insert Tables 3 – 4 About Here] 
 
Tables 3 and 4 provide useful preliminary insights into the relations between the 
variables.  These summary statistics also enable assessment of potential problems with the 
multivariate empirical tests in regards to, for example, collinearity across explanatory variables or 
some other type of misspecification error.  For example, due to the high correlation between the 
regional variables, such variables are not included simultaneously in the multivariate regressions 
presented in the next section.  Alternative multivariate models are presented and discussed below 
in the next section. 
 
4. Multivariate Empirical Analyses 
 
 The multivariate empirical tests in this section focus on logit regression analyses of the 
probability that an institutional investor has a socially responsible private equity investment 
program.  In Table 5 Panel A, we consider all 100 institutional investors in the dataset, regardless 
of whether or not they invest in private equity of any type.  In Table 5 Panel B we consider logit 
regression analyses of the subset of 35 institutional investors that are (2005) or expect to be (2006 
– 2010) invested in private equity.  Table 5 Panel B also considers in Model (11) bivariate logit 
analyses involving two steps: (1) the probability that an institutional investor invests in private 
equity, and (2) the probability that an institutional investor is invested in socially responsible 
private equity.  The Model (11) specification is a useful robustness check to ascertain whether 
there are statistical differences in the subset of firms that invest in private equity versus those that 
do not, and to econometrically correct for those potential differences in the spirit of Heckman 
(1976, 1979).  Table 6 thereafter considers logit regression analyses of the probability that an 
institutional investor invests in social responsibility for any asset class, not only private equity.  
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Each of the regression models (17 in total) are provided to show robustness to alternative subsets 
in the sample, alternative definitions of the dependent variable, and alternative explanatory 
variables.  The variables are as defined above in section 3 and Table 1.  The structure of the data 
in terms of the questions put to the institutional investors in the survey was also designed to 
mitigate any concern with potential endogeneity in the relations studied, as indicated by the 
variable definitions in Table 1.  The alternative specifications across the 17 regression models 
provide further robustness checks for potential collinearity across the variables, and other 
specifications not explicitly reported are available upon request from the authors. 
 
Table 5 provides interesting evidence in respect of the three primary hypotheses outlined 
in section 2.  First, counter to our expectations (Hypothesis 1), socially responsible private equity 
investments are more common among institutional investors that invest internationally.  In 
particular, socially responsible investment is approximately 1-2% more common among 
institutional investors with a 10% greater international investment focus in Europe outside The 
Netherlands (see Models 2, 5, 6, 8 and 11 in Table 5 Panels A and B).  The economic significance 
of a 10% change is as low as 0.4% in Model 6 and as high as 2.7% in Model 11. All of these 
estimates are statistically significant at at least the 10% level of significance, and robust to control 
variables for other factors that influence institutional investor investment allocations.   
 
Table 5 Model 3 indicates that socially responsible private equity investment is not 
statistically different for private equity investments in the United States by Dutch institutional 
investors, when all 100 Dutch institutional investors are considered together regardless of 
whether or not they invest in private equity.  However, when we consider the subsample of Dutch 
institutional investors that invest in private equity separately, the data indicate that socially 
responsible private equity investment is approximately 5-6% more common among institutional 
investors with a 10% greater international investment focus in the United States.  By contrast, 
there is no evidence from any specification that socially responsible private equity investment is 
statistically related to cross-border investment decisions in Asia and/or for domestic investments 
in The Netherlands. 
 
Recall in section 3 that the data showed univariate correlation evidence that socially 
responsible investment is more common among institutional investors that are more sensitive to 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (consistent with Hypothesis 2).  However, it 
appears that other factors independently affect the association between the importance of the 
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IFRS to an institution and the propensity to invest in socially responsible private equity 
investments: the relation between these variables is not robust in a multivariate context with 
controls for other factors in Table 5, Panels A and B.  As such, the data offer suggestive but not 
conclusive evidence that institutions are sensitive to reporting standards and public perception of 
their socially responsible private equity investment activities.  It is nevertheless noteworthy that 
Model (17) in Table 6 (for all types of investment, including public stock markets and not just 
private equity) that the IFRS is statistically related (at the 10% level of significance) to the 
propensity to invest in socially responsible investments.  Model 17 indicates that an increase in 
the ranking of the importance of the IFRS by 1 (on a scale 1 – 5, where 5 is the most important) 
increases the likelihood that an institutional investor will adopt a socially responsible investment 
program by 1.1%.  The data therefore suggest that reporting standards are more closely connected 
to public investments as opposed to private investments, but again, these statistical differences are 
not very pronounced in the data. 
 
In regards to Hypothesis 3, note that the data indicate socially responsible private equity 
investment is more common when the decision to implement such an investment plan is placed in 
more the hands of a Chief Investment Officer (CIO, or the head of capital investments), as 
opposed to a broader investment team.  When a CIO is in charge, a socially responsible private 
equity investment program is approximately 40-50% more likely to be adopted.  As discussed in 
section 2, socially responsible investments are perceived to involve a sacrifice in expected 
returns, and when investment personnel within an organization compete with each other on the 
basis of their returns performance, they are less likely to invest in the potentially lower expected 
return socially responsible investments.  By contrast, when a CIO is in charge of the type of 
investments to be carried out, socially responsible investment programs are much more likely to 
be adopted.  
 
Many of the control variables in the regression models are statistically significant and 
worth mentioning.  Socially responsible private equity investment programs are more common 
among larger institutional investors and those expecting greater economic returns from socially 
responsible investments.  An increase in the rank of the relative returns to socially responsible 
investments by 1 (on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is the lowest) increases the probability of a 
socially responsible investment by 1-3% depending on the specification of the model (see Model 
5 and 7-10).  We find no statistically significant differences in the propensity to carry out socially 
responsible investments depending on the type of investor (pension fund, insurance company or 
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bank / financial institution) in any specification in Tables 5 and 6.  We do find evidence that 
socially responsible investment is approximately 1-3% less common among institutional investors 
that invest a 10% greater proportion in fund-of-funds (see Models 8-9 and 13-16, but the 
statistical significance of this evidence is not robust in some of the other specifications), which is 
expected as fund-of-funds remove the decision making from the institutional investors to the 
fund-of-funds managers. 
 
Finally, note by comparison of Table 6 to Table 5 that the evidence that the factors that 
give rise to socially responsible investment decisions for private equity are quite similar to those 
for other asset classes.  This is a somewhat unexpected result, as private equity is widely viewed 
as a distinctive asset classes.13  We did make note of the fact that the IFRS appears to be 
somewhat more closely related to investments other than private equity, but these differences 
were not statistically pronounced in the data.  It is possible that regulatory factors not captured by 
the data could better explain differences across asset classes, but that issue is beyond the scope of 
this paper and the new dataset used herein.  This issue, along with other related issues is 
discussed further in the next section. 
 
5. Extensions and Future Research 
 
 This paper introduced the first international dataset on socially responsible private equity 
investments.  As the data obtained in this paper are new and unique and extremely difficult to 
obtain from institutional investors, there are of course limitations in the number of observations.  
We nevertheless gathered sufficient details in the data to control for a variety of factors that could 
affect institutional investor allocations to different asset classes and to socially responsible 
investments.  And as we have discussed in the paper, we do not have any reason to believe there 
are biases with regard to sample selection in the data we were able to obtain. 
 
 Our analysis focused on Dutch institutional investor allocations to socially responsible 
private equity investment in The Netherlands, Europe outside The Netherlands (our data cannot 
distinguish between specific countries in Europe due to the confidential nature of the data 
considered), the United States and Asia (again, we cannot distinguish between specific regions).  
We provided suggestive evidence, although not conclusive, that regulations may have different 
effects for different asset classes in regards to social responsibility.  Further work could consider 
                                                 
     13 See references supra note 1. 
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expanding the data in terms of more closely investigating different asset classes, as well as 
possibly for different time periods and different countries (in the spirit of Manignan and Ralston, 
2002; see also Mayer, 2001, for a discussion of differences in institutional investor decisions in 
the United Kingdom versus the United States). 
 
 Given the increase in institutional investor propensity to adopt socially responsible 
investment programs in private equity (and other asset classes), further research could also 
investigate the factors that give rise to private equity fund managers themselves to offer such 
investment alternatives to their institutional investors.  The data introduced in this paper suggest 
there is an increasing demand by institutional investors to invest responsibly, and as such it is 
natural to expect the market to be more sensitive to the socially responsible asset class.  There is 
ample scope for further research to consider when, why and how private fund managers 




The study investigated for the first time the factors that motivate institutional investors to 
allocate capital to sustainable socially responsible private equity investments. We introduced a 
new detailed dataset from a survey of Dutch institutional investors.  The data provided strong 
evidence that Dutch institutional investors are more likely to invest in socially responsible private 
equity investments in Europe outside The Netherlands and in the United States, in contrast to 
domestic Dutch investments and Asian investments.  This evidence was unexpected since prior 
literature (and media) often indicates social harms are more likely to be exported. 
 
The new data introduced herein also provided partial support for the view that socially 
responsible investments are more likely among institutions that consider adherence to 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to be more important.  We also provided 
suggestive evidence that the IFRS is more important for asset classes other than private equity, 
but suggested further research on topic is warranted. 
 
There was also very strong evidence in the data introduced herein that socially 
responsible investments are more likely among institutions that centralize decision making in the 
hands of a Chief Investment Officer.  Institutions that make use of an internal competitive model 
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among investment personnel are more likely to maximize expected profits and not consider social 
responsibility in their decisions.   
 
 Finally, the data indicated socially responsible investment is more common among larger 
institutional investors and those investors expecting greater returns from such investments.  
Overall, we did not find pronounced differences across factors that lead to socially responsible 
investing in private equity versus other asset classes.  Further empirical research on other asset 
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Figure 1. Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) Programs for Private Equity and Other Asset 
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Figure 2. Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) Programs by Type of Institution






Figure 3. For Dutch Based Institutions with >25% of Total Private Equity Investments in a Certain 
Region, What Proportion are Currently Socially Responsible in 2005?










Figure 4. For Dutch Based Institutions with >25% of Total Private Equity Investments in a Certain 
Region, What Proportion Plan on Being Socially Responsible in 2006-2010?












Table 1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
This table presents selected variables and descriptive statistics of in the dataset of 100 Dutch institutional investors based on data collected in 2005.  
 Variable Name Definition  Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
Observations 
Social Responsible Investment 
Program 2005 - 2010 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for institutions that currently 
have a socially responsible investment program as at 2005, 
or plan on adopting one in 2006 – 2010  
0.43 0 0.50 0.00 1.00 100 
Social Responsible Investment 
Program 2005 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for institutions that currently 
have a socially responsible investment program as at 2005 0.24 0 0.46 0.00 1.00 100 
Social Responsible Private Equity 
Investment Program 2005 - 2010 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for institutions that currently 
have a socially responsible private equity investment 
program as at 2005, or plan on adopting one in 2006 – 2010  
0.19 0 0.39 0.00 1.00 100 
Social Responsible Private Equity 
Investment Program 2005 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for institutions that currently 
have a socially responsible private equity investment 
program as at 2005 
0.14 0 0.35 0.00 1.00 100 
The Netherlands Domestic Private 
Equity Investment 
The percentage of the institutions’ private equity investments 
in The Netherlands expected for 2006 – 2010. 0.25 0 1.27 0.00 9.00 100 
European (outside The Netherlands) 
Private Equity Investment 
The percentage of the institutions’ private equity investments 
in Europe excluding The Netherlands expected for 2006 – 
2010. 
0.69 0 1.58 0.00 11.25 100 
US Private Equity Investment The percentage of the institutions’ private equity investments in the U.S. expected for 2006 – 2010. 0.41 0 1.00 0.00 5.63 100 
Asia Private Equity Investment The percentage of the institutions’ private equity investments in Asia expected for 2006 – 2010. 0.05 0 0.25 0.00 2.06 100 
Fund of Fund Investment 2006 - 2010 The percentage of the institutions’ direct private equity fund-of-fund investments expected for 2006 – 2010. 0.62 0 1.49 0.00 8.00 100 
International Financial Reporting 
Standards 
The institutional investor’s rank (1=low and 5=high) of the 
importance of the new International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) (2005) for the decision to invest 
2.23 2 0.92 1.00 5.00 100 
Rank of Attractiveness of Returns to 
Sustainable Investment 
The institutional investor’s rank (1=low and 5=high) of the 
comparative attractiveness of the returns to adopting a 
socially responsible investment program relative to not 
adopting such a program 
2.49 3 1.16 1.00 5.00 100 
Chief Investment Officer 
Responsibility 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for institutions that allocate the 
responsibility to adopting a socially responsible investment 
program to a single Chief Investment Officer 
0.08 0 0.27 0.00 1.00 100 
Assets (millions of Euros) The total assets managed by the institutional investor (in millions of 2005 Euros) 4,753.00 800 9,060.41 300 50,000 100 
Pension Fund A dummy variable equal to 1 for a pension fund institutional investor 0.56 1 0.50 0 1 100 
Insurance Company A dummy variable equal to 1 for an insurance company institutional investor 0.25 0 0.44 0 1 100 
Bank / Financial  Institution A dummy variable equal to one for a bank / financial institutional investor 0.19 0 0.39 0 1 100 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
This table summarizes the data by the characteristics of the institutional investors in terms of assets and number of institutions with a socially responsible investment program (Panel A), and their current 
and future asset allocations (Panel B). 
Panel A. Characteristics of the Institutional Investors in the Dataset 
Type of Financial Institution 
Number of Institutions in the 
dataset 
Average Assets 
(millions of  
Euros) 
Number of Institutions With a 
Socially Responsible 
Investment Program 
Number of Institutions with a Socially 
Responsible Investment Program in 2005 or 
Planning to Adopt One in 2006 – 2010  
Pension Fund 56 € 2,942.86  14 23 
Insurance Company  25 € 5,008.00  10 13 
Bank 19 € 9,752.63  5 7 
All Types of Institutional Investors 100 € 4,753.00  29 43 
Panel B. Asset Allocations (Percentage of Assets Invested in Different Asset Classes) 
 ...Current (as at 2005) 







Other Types of 
Alternative 
Investments Other 
Pension Fund 33.38 50.89 4.32 1.60 1.17 7.43 1.21 
Insurance Company  23.80 55.72 9.56 0.48 0.73 6.23 3.48 
Bank 27.32 48.43 5.11 0.58 1.36 16.05 1.16 
All Types of Institutional Investors 29.83 51.63 5.78 1.13 1.09 8.77 1.77 
 …Planned (for the period 2006-2010) 







Other Types of 
Alternative 
Investments Other 
Pension Fund 31.51 51.73 2.86 1.97 1.67 9.53 0.73 
Insurance Company  24.71 59.02 2.52 2.16 0.62 8.37 2.60 
Bank 24.95 47.59 2.68 1.05 1.86 21.34 0.53 





Table 3. Difference of Means, Proportions and Medians Tests  
This table presents difference of means, proportions and medians tests for the population of institutional investors that do and do not have as at 2005 (or plan on having for 2006 – 2010) a 
socially responsible private equity investment program.  *, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Socially Responsible Private Equity 
Investment Program (current at 2005 or 
planned for 2006 – 2010) 
No Socially Responsible Private 
Equity Investment Program (current 
at 2005 or planned for 2006 – 2010)    
Number of 
Observations Mean Median 
Number of 







Test for Dummy 
Variables) 
The Netherlands Domestic Private Equity Investment 19 0.34 0.00 81 0.2353 0.00 0.52  p <= 0.146 
European (outside The Netherlands) Private Equity Investment 19 2.39 1.88 81 0.30 0.00 3.55*** p <= 0.000*** 
US Private Equity Investment 19 1.67 1.13 81 0.12 0.00 3.98*** p <= 0.000*** 
Asia Private Equity Investment 19 0.16 0.00 81 0.03 0.00 1.92* p <= 0.213 
Fund of Funds Private Equity Investment 19 1.35 0.88 81 0.45 0.00 2.35** p <= 0.000*** 
International Financial Reporting Standards 19 2.63 3.00 81 2.14 2.00 1.89* p <= 0.677  
Rank of Attractiveness of Returns to Sustainable Investment 19 2.89 3.00 81 2.40 3.00 1.76*  p <= 0.171 
Chief Investment Officer Responsibility 19 0.32 0.00 81 0.02 0.00 2.62** 4.21*** 
Log (Assets) 19 12336.84 6500.00 81 2974.07 800.00 3.10*** p <= 0.001*** 
Pension Fund 19 0.47 1.00 81 0.58 1.00 -0.82 -0.84 
Insurance Company 19 0.32 0.00 81 0.23 0.00 0.72 0.77 




Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
This table presents correlation coefficients across selected variables as defined in Table 1. Correlations significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold and underline font.  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) Social Responsible Investment Program 2005 - 2010 1.00                           
(2) Social Responsible Investment Program 2005 0.74 1.00                         
(3) Social Responsible Private Equity Investment Program 2005 - 2010 0.56 0.48 1.00                       
(4) Social Responsible Private Equity Investment Program 2005 0.46 0.63 0.83 1.00                     
(5) The Netherlands Domestic Private Equity Investment -0.07 -0.07 0.03 -0.01 1.00                   
(6) European (outside The Netherlands) Private Equity Investment 0.20 0.19 0.52 0.44 0.03 1.00                 
(7) US Private Equity Investment 0.28 0.25 0.61 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00               
(8) Asia Private Equity Investment 0.07 0.00 0.22 0.09 0.02 0.32 0.53 1.00             
(9) Fund of Funds Private Equity Investment -0.01 -0.01 0.24 0.16 0.34 0.45 0.32 0.41 1.00           
(10) International Financial Reporting Standards 0.07 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.23 -0.10 0.29 1.00         
(11) Rank of Attractiveness of Returns to Sustainable Investment 0.26 0.05 0.17 0.05 -0.14 0.04 0.08 0.05 -0.09 -0.14 1.00       
(12) Chief Investment Officer Responsibility 0.19 0.06 0.42 0.20 0.00 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.37 0.13 0.07 1.00     
(13) Log (Assets) 0.17 0.18 0.46 0.40 -0.02 0.26 0.36 0.12 0.31 0.37 -0.17 0.27 1.00   
(14) Pension Fund -0.04 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.18 -0.26 0.18 -0.11 -0.33 1.00 




Table 5. Logit Regression Analyses for Sustainable / Socially Responsible Private Equity Investment  
This table presents logit regression estimates of the probability adoption of a sustainable and socially responsible investment policy in private equity by a Dutch institutional investor.  Panel A considers all 100 
institutional investors in the sample regardless of whether or not they are or plan on investing in private equity.  In Models (1) - (5), adoption of a sustainable and socially responsible investment policy includes 
means either adoption has taken place as at 2005, or the institution plans to adopt such a policy sometime within the period 2006-2010.  In Model (6) adoption only refers to the current practice as at 2005.  Panel B 
considers the subsample of institutional investors that will be invested in private equity in the period 2006 – 2010 in Models (7) – (10).  Model (11) in Panel B involves a 2-step bivariate regression in the spirit of 
Heckman (1976, 1979) whereby in the first step the probability that the institution invests in private equity is estimated, while in the second step the probability that the institution makes socially responsible private 
equity investments is estimated.  The independent variables are as defined in Table 1.  The coefficients on the independent variables are robust to potential problems associated with collinearity of included and 
excluded variables.  The total population of firms comprises 100 Dutch institutional investors described in Tables 1 and 2.  The values presented are not the standard logit coefficients; rather, they are the marginal 
effects so that the economic significance is shown alongside the statistical significance.  *, **, *** Significant difference for the sample of all other firms in the group at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Full Sample of 100 Dutch Institutions 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
  

























The Netherlands Domestic Private Equity Investment 0.015 0.632                     
European (outside The Netherlands) Private Equity 
Investment     0.111 2.180**         0.075 1.710* 0.040 1.818* 
US Private Equity Investment         0.262 1.549             
Asia Private Equity Investment             0.145 0.998         
Fund of Funds Private Equity Investment -0.014 -0.577 -0.069 -1.685* -0.095 -1.303 -0.025 -0.788 -0.042 -1.302 -0.028 -1.322 
International Financial Reporting Standards 0.015 0.386 -0.006 -0.172 0.021 0.475 0.034 0.823 0.005 0.178 0.027 1.117 
Rank of Attractiveness of Returns to Sustainable 
Investment                 0.046 1.875* 0.020 1.096 
Chief Investment Officer Responsibility 0.496 2.044** 0.661 2.423** 0.621 2.190** 0.459 1.893* 0.512 1.414 0.096 0.817 
Log (Assets) 0.085 3.454*** 0.069 2.591*** 0.049 1.692* 0.080 3.356*** 0.056 2.164** 0.044 2.464** 
Pension Fund 0.137 1.376 0.130 1.167 0.072 0.590 0.136 1.361 0.097 1.086 0.101 1.348 
Insurance Company 0.110 0.798 0.201 1.041 0.173 0.992 0.107 0.793 0.154 0.887 0.088 0.818 
Model Diagnostics             
Number of Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number of Observations where Dependent Variable = 1 19 19 19 19 19 14 
Adjusted R2 (pseudo R2 for Model 1) 0.314 0.541 0.530 0.323 0.596 0.393 
Loglikehood Function -33.348 -22.318 -22.837 -32.906 -19.633 -24.596 
Chi Square Statistic  30.549*** 52.608*** 51.570*** 31.434*** 57.978*** 31.801*** 





Table 5 (Continued) 
Panel B. Subsample of Private Equity Investments (Models (7) - (10)) and Bivatiate Logit Estimates with Sample Selection (Model (11)) 
Model (11) Model (7) 
Subsample of 












Institutions in Private 
Equity 
Step 1: Probability of 
Investment in Private 
Equity 
Step 2: Probability of 
Socially Responsible 













Constant -0.716 -1.155 -2.477 -2.207** -1.349 -1.376 -2.173 -2.103** -3.490 -3.315*** -4.451 -2.786*** 
The Netherlands Domestic Investment -0.025 -0.339                     
European (outside The Netherlands) Investment     0.204 1.764*             0.274 2.039** 
US Investment         0.574 2.227**             
Asia Investment             0.217 0.680         
Fund of Funds Investment -0.113 -1.481 -0.188 -1.950* -0.271 -1.983** -0.173 -1.574         
International Financial Reporting Standards -0.088 -0.711 -0.063 -0.392 0.002 0.016 0.011 0.067     -0.380 -1.622 
Rank of Attractiveness of Returns to Sustainable Investment 0.375 1.851* 0.207 1.621 0.245 1.837* 0.237 1.955*         
Attractiveness of Returns to Private Equity versus Public Equity                 0.013 3.506***     
Chief Investment Officer Responsibility     0.470 2.506** 0.404 2.125** 0.450 1.983**     0.700 1.448 
Log (Assets) 0.122 1.566 0.211 2.018** 0.060 0.567 0.188 1.944* 0.243 1.587 0.290 2.883*** 
Pension Fund 0.151 0.528 0.324 0.962 0.037 0.110 0.279 0.920         
Insurance Company 0.159 0.579 0.289 1.064 0.194 0.862 0.083 0.256         
Model Diagnostics             
Number of Observations 35 35 35 35 100 35 
Number of Observations where Dependent Variable = 1 19 19 19 19 35 19 
Adjusted R2 (pseudo R2 for Model 1) 0.193 0.406 0.440 0.296  
Loglikehood Function -19.466 -14.323 -13.520 -16.990 -46.219 






Table 6. Logit Regression Analyses for Sustainable / Socially Responsible Investment  
This table presents logit regression estimates of the probability adoption of a sustainable and socially responsible investment policy in any asset class by a Dutch institutional investor.  In Models (12) - (16), adoption 
of a sustainable and socially responsible investment policy includes means either adoption has taken place as at 2005, or the institution plans to adopt such a policy sometime within the period 2006-2010.  In Model 
(17) adoption only refers to the current practice as at 2005.  The independent variables are as defined in Table 1.  The coefficients on the independent variables are robust to potential problems associated with 
collinearity of included and excluded variables.  The total population of firms comprises 100 Dutch institutional investors described in Tables 1 and 2.  The values presented are not the standard logit coefficients; 
rather, they are the marginal effects so that the economic significance is shown alongside the statistical significance.  *, **, *** Significant difference for the sample of all other firms in the group at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 


























The Netherlands Domestic Investment -0.021 -0.373                     
European (outside The Netherlands) Investment     0.156 1.975**         0.144 1.698* 0.071 1.598 
US Investment         0.412 1.717*             
Asia Investment             0.229 0.867         
Fund of Funds Investment -0.073 -1.363 -0.173 -2.191** -0.229 -1.809* -0.102 -1.575 -0.157 -1.962** -0.088 -1.631 
International Financial Reporting Standards 0.033 0.504 0.014 0.201 0.021 0.294 0.048 0.688 0.018 0.247 0.113 1.915* 
Rank of Attractiveness of Returns to Sustainable 
Investment                 0.121 2.344** 0.027 0.648 
Chief Investment Officer Responsibility 0.406 2.327** 0.476 3.219*** 0.459 2.957*** 0.400 2.252** 0.441 2.415** 0.047 0.233 
Log (Assets) 0.071 1.740* 0.066 1.531 0.038 0.776 0.073 1.793* 0.077 1.707* 0.048 1.409 
Pension Fund 0.227 1.481 0.269 1.631 0.210 1.195 0.233 1.516 0.203 1.143 0.189 1.313 
Insurance Company 0.219 1.341 0.286 1.726* 0.257 1.555 0.220 1.353 0.262 1.480 0.275 1.566 
Model Diagnostics             
Number of Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number of Observations where Dependent Variable = 1 43 43 43 43 43 29 
Adjusted R2 (pseudo R2 for Model 1) 0.072 0.124 0.143 0.076 0.167 0.120 
Loglikehood Function -63.440 -59.866 -58.559 -63.120 -56.929 -52.994 
Chi Square Statistic 9.783 16.930**  19.545***  10.424*** 22.805*** 14.442*** 
 
